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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
r ~ rrn~D P.\IU\: CITY ~fiNES COl\l-
p .\ ~ Y, a <'Ol'liOration, 
Plaintiff, 
- YS.-
1,HE I~DlT~TRIAL CO:JIMIS.SION 
OF tTAH & JOHN \Y. PRESCOTT, 
Defendants. 
CasP No. 
10061 
BRIEF O·F PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This i~ an appeal fron1 an order of the Industrial 
('ommission of rtah granting defendant Prescott (here-
in called .. Prescott") cmnpensation for pennanent total 
disability on the basis of injuries which, plaintiff con-
tends, art> properly compensable as being only partially 
disabling under ~Pction 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
DI~PO~ITIOX BY IXDrSTRIAL CO~I:JIISSIOX 
The Industrial Commission ordered payment of 
compensation for permanent total disability in accord-
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ance with the provisions of Section 35-1-67, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks vacation of the aforesaid order of 
the Industrial Commission on the grounds ( 1) that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and in excess of its powers 
in finding and concluding that the injuries sustained by 
defendant Prescott in his enlploYJ.nent resulted in perma-
nent total disability, and (2) that the findings do not 
support the award under review. 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
Prescott was involved in a tragic mine accident on 
July 13, 1961. His injuries included fractures of right 
ribs and shoulder blade and right lung puncture. He 
complains of some residuals from these injuries, (sore-
ness of his right arm and a sensation of numbness in 
his right side (R-62) ), but there is no medical evidence 
of significant functional impairment or failure of these 
injured members to heal ( R-5, 15, 23, 83, 88, 89; and 
refer to comments in Argument). 
The injury of real consequence (so far as disability 
evaluation is concerned) was a traumatic amputation 
of Prescott's left leg with associated avulsion of soft 
tissue in the inguinal area. Further surgical amputation 
and debridement have left little soft tissue with which a 
prosthetic device can make contact (R-20), and Pres-
cott has very limited ambulation with an artificial leg. 
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Prescott was referred to a Medical Advisory Board 
appointed hy the Commission for evaluation of the disa-
bility from hi~ work-rPlatt•d injuries. The Board found 
Prescott to hun• sustained a 90o/o loss of '"bodily func-
tion'' as that tenn is employed in the next to concluding 
paragraph of Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. 1953, the section 
relating to pern1anent partial disability (R-15). 
Pn·~eott does not contest or disagree with the 90% 
rating of the :Medical Advisory Board. He rnerely con-
tends that a 90)c ''loss of bodily function" is tantmnount 
to total disability (R-52, 5-l). 
Finally, Prescott is more than sixty-six years of age 
(H-~>~) and of lower average mentality (R-23, 83). Be-
cau8e of his age, 1nentality and limited ambulation, he 
cannot compete for employment (R-82). He has made 
n good psychological and emotional adjustment to his 
injury (R-23, 8-t). 
ARGU~1:ENT 
POINT I 
THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF FUNCTION IN 
THIS CASE IS THE LOSS ATTENDANT UPON LEG 
AMPUTATION, AND THE RULE THAT PERMA-
NENT TOTAL DISABILITY MAY BE PRE1SUMED 
FROM INABILITY TO RESUME PRE-INJURY TYPE 
OF WORK DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE LOSS 
SUSTAINED IS ONE OF THOSE IN THE STATU-
TORY SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC AWARDS. 
\Y e would not atte1npt to minimize the functional 
loss Prescott sustained by reason of the amputation of 
his leg. The trauma and subsequent surgical procedures 
have clearly left Prescott in essentially the position of 
an amputee whose shunp is not sufficient to permit 
the use of an artificial leg. This was his testimony, and 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the rating g1ven hiln by the ?\ledieal AclYi~or)· Board 
entitles hi1n to exactly what the statute provides for 
amputation at the hip. 
The error we see in the Con11nission's position is 
that it has found permanent total disability on this loss 
of function coupled only with the fact that Prescott is 
too old, in view of his lower average Inentality, to be 
employable. vV e sub1nit that such a finding constitutes 
an administrative construction of the statute which is 
in direct conflict with the construction given it by this 
Court. 
vVe must agree that this Court, by its decisions 
beginning with Caillet v. Industrial Commission (90 
Utah 8, June 18, 1936) and concluding with Thomas v. 
Commission (95 Utah 32, ~;fay 11, 1938), evolved a rule 
of law that permanent total disability is established, in 
a proper case, by a showing that the injured workman 
cannot perform work of the kind he was performing 
when injured or any other work which a man of his 
mentality or attainments might do. The first problem 
is to determine what is a proper case. 
The decision which best states the philosophy of 
the Court as it applies to the instant case is Babick v. 
Industrial Commission (91 Utah 581, 65 P.2d 1133). 
Justice Wolfe there reconsidered the language of the 
Caillet decision (which announced the general principle 
of law to which we have referred) and refined the 
judicial statement by this commentary: 
"In the Caillet Case, the applicant had one 
hand off and two fingers of the other hand ampu-
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tatt·d. ahnost to tlll' \\Tist, whj('h gave hiin 100 per 
<'Pnt loss of function of one hand and 60 per cent 
ot' tiH· other. He had a 20 per cent loss of knee 
ad ion. Th< · <·Yiden<·e showed that his ability to 
do any work substantiall~· renumerative was so 
negligible as to approach the vanishing point . 
.Jloreover, the opportunity to secure the very few 
types of work he could do was nil. Perhaps the 
language from that case above quoted is a little 
too inclusive. It would fit the person who had 
one h·g or an arm off. A workman who had 
done manual labor who lost an arm or leg could 
not 'perform the work of the general character 
that he was performing when injured,' and yet 
under a strict following of this rule he would 
P~tablish a prima facie case. In the first place, 
tlw rule "·as not meant to operate in any case 
where specific compensation for a loss of a mem-
lwr or loss of function of a mernber was provided 
hy statute for pennanent partial disability." 
Tlw Commission's determination that this is a 
proper case for the application of the Caillet doctrine 
is the first error we would cite. Prescott's injury-related 
disability is essentially that which attends the loss of 
a leg. X o one who has evaluated this disability has 
attached any iinportance to the residuals from the frac-
tures and lung lesion. \V e believe the following is a 
fully revealing sunuuary of the n1edical evidence with 
reference to the final disabling result of the injuries 
to the uppPr torso: 
1. As early as July 26, 1961, (less than two 
weeks after the injury) Dr. Boyd Holbrook, 
an orthopaedic specialist, examined Prescott 
and reported his findings in a letter dated 
August 2, 1962 (R-p. 5). The gist of the re-
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port is that there should be no significant 
disability from the fractures, thPre being no 
neurological or circulatory impail'lnent to the 
injury sites. vVe believe one paragraph of the 
report can be quoted as fairly sununarizing 
the medical opinion : 
"This type of InJury ordinarily heals 
with little if any disability. In view of the 
1nany injuries he has sustained, I would ad-
vise continued conservative treatment in this 
area, and would not recommend operative 
repair. If his symptoms persist in this area 
after sufficient time for healing, the inner 
one inch of the clavicle can be excised." 
There is nowhere in this record any indication 
that Prescott thereafter consulted Dr. Hol-
brook or any other physician with reference 
to "continued symptoms in this area" or that 
such symptoms could not be relieved in the 
manner Dr. Holbrook suggests if they per-
sisted. 
2. The ~1:edical Advisory Board evaluated Pres-
cott's permanent disability on August 25, 
19·62. The Board found (R-15) that the multi-
ple injuries resulted in a ''90% loss of bodily 
function." Significantly, the compensation 
payable for this percentage loss of function 
is exactly the same as that payable for ampu-
tation of a leg where prosthesis is not feasible. 
It is obvious that the Board (while making 
its rating inclusive of all injuries as it must) 
considered the upper torso problem to be de 
minimis and the only consequential disability 
to be that related to the amputation, a kind of 
loss for which the statutory schedule specifi-
cally provides. 
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:;. Dr. Hoy A. Darke, aftPr an examination of 
PrP~<'ott on January 22, 1963, reported (R-23) 
that Prescott "could likely do well with any 
manual training that did not require fine pre-
eise movements." He suggests no impairment 
of 1nanual dexterity from injury. 
-l. Prescott was evaluated by the Division of 
Yocational Rehibilitation of the State Depart-
ment of Public Instruction, and a report was 
made by Mr. Paul ·T. Furlong (R-29, 30) who 
also testified (R-72 through 83). l\Ir. Fur-
long's opinion of unemployability is based 
unequivocally on these factors : 
a. Age. 
b. Lo~~ of effective an1bulation. 
c. Past job history and education. 
d. :Mentality. 
Thi~ was his concluding testhnony as Pres-
cott's witness (R-83), and not a word was 
elicited frmn him on redirect as to his at-
tachment of any importance to the injuries of 
the upper torso. 
;), Pursuant to a Commission order made during 
the course of the hearing in this 1natter, Pres-
cott was examined by Dr. L. E. Viko, an in-
h-'rni~t, for evaluation of heart and lung path-
ology. In a two page report (R-88, 89), DT. 
Yiko said he ••found, then, no specific lung 
pathology." "He (Prescott) does have myo-
cardial changes presumably on an arterio-
sclerotic basis." Arteriosclerosis is not, of 
course, an incident of trauma. Dr. Viko fur-
ther found the "lungs and abdomen were neg-
ative" for pathology except for diminished 
heart sounds, and the "lungs were surprisingly 
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negative for a 1nan who had been 33 years at 
1nining work." 
On the whole record, therefore, it n1ust lw conceded 
that the fractures and lung lesion, howPver strongly thP~' 
may have contributed to the general discomfort and 
the 1nanagement problem, are not significant in the 
final evaluation of disability. Vve are evaluating a man 
who, because of injury, has lost a leg and cannot use 
an artificial one. This is a kind of loss for which the 
statutory schedule specifically provides. Except for 
that, the factors which 1nake him unemployable (his 
advanced age, his inability to learn, his limited work 
experience) are entirely unrelated to his injury. 
We subn1it that this is not a proper case for appli-
cation of the Caillet doctrine. That doctrine has only 
been applied where there have been two or more anato-
mical members or vital systems substantially impaired. 
The decisions in point and the me1nbers or systems 
involved are these : 
Caillet v. Commission (supra) - Amputa-
tion of one hand - 60o/o loss of function of the 
other hand - 20% loss of knee action. 
Standard Coal Co. v. Commission (91 l~tah 
549; 65 P.2d 640) - Loss of use equivalent to 
amputation of one leg - disabling circulatory 
disturbance of other leg (frmn which bone was 
taken) presumably injury related-injury-related 
obesity. 
Carbon Fuel Co. v. Commission (92 Utah 
410; 68 P.2d 894) - Drop foot - lordosis, right 
hip irreparably out of socket - left femur frac-
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tnn•d at llP<·k- both hip:-; unstable- inch separ-
ntion of ~ymph~·~is puhi:-;. 
Thoma ..... · v. Commission (:-;npra) - Loss of 
usP of one leg - phlebitis causing j()j~ loss of 
other leg and requiring extensive bed care frOin 
tinH' to time. 
To appl~· tlw Cailld doctrinP in a case where the 
only si~ni fieant disahi lit:· results frOin a loss of func-
tion <·overed hy a ~p<'eifie statutory provision is a mani-
fpst departure frOin the rule of the Babick case. It 
\rould <'l'Pah• a dimatP in which the first objective of 
any permanently injured workman would be to demon-
~trak his inability to learn or be rehabilitated. 
POINT II 
9or,-~' LOSS OF FUNCTION UNDER SECTION 35-1-66, 
U.C.A. 1953, IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO ·TOTAL 
DISABILITY. 
\ r e would emphasize, at the outset, that Prescott 
has eom•eded the accurac~· of the J.\;Iedical Advisory Board 
di~ahility rating (R-15) which was "90% loss of bodily 
function." Counsel so stated at page 52 and again at 
page 3-! of the Reeord. Prescott's only contention is 
that 90j~ loss of function is so close to total loss that 
it should be considered the equivalent. If the term 
"bodily function," as it is used in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A., 
meant .. total of bodily functions," we would concede 
that Prt:>scott's position in this case is unassailable. A 
person who has only 10% of his life processes in function 
is helpless and totally disabled by any standard. The 
term cannot rationally be assigned such a Ineaning, how-
t>ver, and this Court has expressed itself on the point. 
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In the first place, the phrase "loss of bodily func-
tion" appears only in the section on pernranent partial 
disabiltiy (35-1-66), and that section contemplates that, 
in the event there is a total loss of a bodily function not 
specifically provided for, the limit of compensation 
should be 200 weeks. The paragraph in which the 
term appears is this : 
''For any other disfigurement or the loss of 
bodily function not otherwise provided for herein, 
such period of compensation as the commission 
shall deem equitable and in proportion as near 
as rnay be to c01npensation for specific loss as 
set forth in the schedule in this section but not 
exceeding in any case two hundred weeks." 
\vnen the .Jiedical Advisory Board makes a rating in 
tern1s of "loss of bodily function," then, it is orienting to 
the only section of the \Vorlrmen's Compensation Act 
which employs that tern1 and equating the loss it finds 
with the specific losses set forth in the schedulr pre-
ceding the quoted paragraph. \Yhat the ::~Iedical Ad-
visory Board found in fact was that the loss of function 
Prescott sustained fron1 his injuries was 90% as dis-
abling as the loss of an ann at the shoulder. It did 
not find that Prescott's disability was 90% of perma-
nent total disability. Prescott admits that this rating 
ts accurate. 
\Y e have prY'.Tionsly herein sajd that this Court has 
already construed 35-1-GG as \H' contend it must be 
construed. In Babick v. Commission (supra), a clear 
distinction was drawn between two "zones" of disability. 
Disabilities to be appraised in terrns of permanent total 
10 
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disability under SPetion 35-1-67 are in one zone; those 
to h .. appraised in tern1s of pPnnanent partial disability 
undl'r section 35-1-66 are in another. We would refer 
t hi' Court to the discussion at 91 Utah 585. In this case, 
the Conunission (R-16), Prescott (R-5-1, 56) and the 
plaintiff all ackno\vledge that Prescott's disability falls 
within the latter zone. Everybody recognizes that Pres-
colt is not totally disabled from his injttries. 
lf wP labor this point, we do so to illuminate the 
central issue in this case: It is proper to award perma-
nPnt total disability cmnpensation to a workman, whose 
permanent disability is admittedly rated properly at 
90% of the loss of an arm, because he had reached, at 
the time of his injury, an age where one of his mentality 
cannot compete successfully in the labor market 1 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED, AS 
THE TEST OF TOTAL DISABILITY, THE DOC-
TRINE OF THE CAILLET CASE, AND THAT DOC-
TRINE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED. 
There is little question about the basis upon which 
the Comn1ission decided this case. Commissioner Wies-
l~y. during the course of the hearing, accurately stated 
tlw doctrine of Caillet v. Commission (supra) and fur-
ther expressed his belief that it constituted the law of 
the case. At the bottom of page 77 of the Record, we 
find this: 
"THE REFEREE: The last decision of the 
Supreme Court that I can recall, written by 
Justice Moffat, says that the test of total perma-
nent disability is can the man do the same kind 
11 
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of work he did before, or by reasonable pffort 
prepare hin1self for similar work. But whether 
that will stand up, l\Ir. Allen, or not, I don't 
know. But that's the last word that I kno\\·. :--;o 
I think he may answer." 
In the order itself (R-104, 105), only one Utah case i:-; 
cited, and that case is Caillet v. Cmnrnission. 
As we have previously pointed out, th<' Caillet clo<'-
trine has been substantially n1odified. Even in a proper 
case (which we have already argued this is not) the 
test is not whether the en1ployee can return to the sam<' 
or si1nilar eu1ployn1ent, but whether he can function 
in an econmnic activity "\Vhich one of his 1nentality and 
attainn1ents can perforn1. \Ve quote the following from 
Justice Wolfe's dissenting opinion in the Thomas case 
(supra): 
"The language of Caillet v. Industriol Comm., 
90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760, quoted by the prevailing 
opinion, was so broad as to take in cases of th1· 
loss of a hand. In such case an employee might 
show that he was unable without a hand to do 
work of the general character he had been doing, 
and this made out a prilna facie case. And if the 
other side could not show that he could secure 
and perform work of a special nature, he would 
be as a matter of law, under that rule, perma-
nently and totally disabled. The rule was too nar-
row and too wide. It was too narrow in that 
it n1ade the prin1a facie test in law of permanent 
and total disability purely the question of whether 
he could perform work of the general character 
that he had been performing when injured. It 
did not add the phrase 'or anY other work which 
' . 
a 1nan of his mentality or attainments might do.' 
It was too wide in that it brought in the eco-
12 
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nomic situation as a factor in ovcrcmning the 
prima facie case. It n1ight be ilnpossible in a 
dP}H'I'~~ion to obtain work of a special nature or 
any kind of work for a fully able n1an, whilst 
in war timP:::;, when every available man is utiliz-
able, any nu1nber of (•ripples could obtain jobs. 
Thi~ would 1nean that the prima facie case would 
hP met ~uect'ssfully only accordingly to the vary-
ing economic situations. The statute nev(-'l' con-
templated such a thing." 
In the instant ea~<>, there is cmnpetent evidence 
hy a uwdical expert, Dr. Darke (R-23), that Prescott 
"would likPly do wt'll with 1nanual training that did not 
n•quirP t'i1H•, precise 1novements or attention to fine 
('Omplirated details." The inescapable conclusion to be 
drawn frmn the Record is that the Commission never 
considered this evidence as having relevance because of 
it~ conYiction that the "test" is ability to return to the 
·''(fll/(' or ,...,.; milar en1ployn1ent. 
The Record clearly establishes that Prescott is 
limitPd, phy~ieally, to sedentary occupation. This would 
be true by reason of his arteriosclerosis (R-88, 89) even 
if he had not lost a leg, and the sclerosis is not work-
rt>lated. \Yithin that lilnitation, he is capable of carrying 
on any activity which an uneducated man of lower aver-
agt' mentality can do. All that :Jir. Furlong added to 
our understanding of Prescott's situation is that there 
aren't any jobs for 66 year old, uneducated, untrained 
men who have little n1obility and lower average men-
tality. It is also true that there aren't any jobs for 
~ueh men who do have n1obility (R-80, 81). If en1ployers 
haye a choice, they will hire a man who is young, 
13 
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trained, intelligent and nwbile over one who has none 
of these virtues. Therefore, say~ l\fr. Furlong, Prescott 
could not find a job for which there was "competition" 
(R-81). ~Ir. Furlong nowhere says, however, that Pres-
cott could not perform, if he were given such a job. By 
:Mr. Furlong's standards, a man becon1es permmwntly 
and totally disabled when he reaches sixty-five unless 
he can demonstrate a skill, a talent or a mental facility 
which will overcmne prospective mnployers' natural 
preference for younger men. 
"\Ve submit that n1ost of the factors to which ~Ir. 
Furlong gives weight (Prescott's age, mentality, laek 
of education or training and his wife's arthritis (R-29, 
30)) have no relation to his injury. To predicate em-
ployer liability to pay benefits for total disability upon 
those factors violates a basic principle of compensation 
la\Y which is, as stated by the editors of Corpus Juris 
Secundum (99 C.J.S. 1067), that "in order to warrant 
compensation for total disabilit:·, the inability to worli 
n1ust be due to the injury." 
POINT IV 
THIS IS NOT A CASE WHERE A FINDING OF 
COMMISSION IS UNDER ATTACK. THE IS<SUE ON 
WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT IS PURELY AN 
ISSUE OF LAW. 
\V P are a warP of the Court's strong reluctance to 
disturb a finding of fact 1nade by the Industrial Com-
Inission, and the Court's justified belief that it can 
rely on the Con11nission's expertise in evaluating the 
evideneP and the credibility of witnesses. \Ve yield to 
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norw in our n·spPd for thP { 'mu111i~sion's cmnpetence 
nnd till' soundness of its jndgnwnt in this regard. The 
t'aet~ are not in dispute in this case, however. The 
( 'olnmi~~ion found and everyone agrees that the disa-
hility from injury is <•ssPntially the smne as the loss 
of a leg at the hip. Everyone agrees and the Cmn-
mission presmnably found that Prescott, because of 
factors of agP, 1nentality, training and education, is 
not likely to win in cmnpetition for jobs. \Vhether or 
uot this kind of unemployabilit~, amounts to per1nanent 
total disability within the meaning of the Compensa-
tion Aets is a pure question of law. We concur in the 
findings of fact; W<' believe the Commission's conclusion 
of law cannot properly be drawn frmn those facts. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
CLYDE, ~fECHAM & PRATT 
By FRANK: J. ALLEN 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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